Review

Reviewed Work(s): The Faust Legend: Popular Formula and Modern Novel by Marguerite de Huszar Allen
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Marguerite Allen's *The Faust Legend* is a worthwhile contribution to Faust criticism. In the first part of her book Allen discusses the *Faustbuch* as an inversion of the popular hagiographies of the 16th century. In the second part she seeks to interpret Thomas Mann's *Doktor Faustus* in the light of this new reading of the *Faustbuch*, i.e., as a modern novel that appropriates but also complicates the anti-hagiographical element of the Faust story.

Nineteenth-century critics had recognized similarities between the *Faustbuch* and individual stories within the Roman Catholic Calendar of Saints, and in the 1930s general parallels were proposed by Harold Meek and André Jolles. Drawing on this Faust criticism and John Cawelti's definition of formulaic fiction, Allen reads the *Faustbuch* as an inversion of the literary structure of Jacobus de Voragine's *The Golden Legend*. The holy lives of the saints, each one an embellished *imitatio Christi*, were presented as anecdotal adventure stories in which the saints battle and overcome the Devil. The *Faustbuch* inverts this formula. The saints’ miracles become Faust’s magic, their virtuous deeds his misdeeds. Chastity is turned into lasciviousness, and faith becomes despair. Faust’s pact with the devil, signed in blood, inverts the sacrament of Holy Communion, his trip to Rome is a blasphemous alternative to the idea of holy pilgrimage, and his final confession and farewell mocks Christ’s Last Supper. The reader no longer sees a life worth emulating but a warning, a cautionary lesson on the consequences of evil.

Appropriating Cawelti’s twofold definition of formulaic fiction, Allen sees in the *Faustbuch*, first, a vitalization of a standardized narrative, namely, the narrative of the saints, and second, a story with “danger, violence, excitement, and sex” (p. 51), which nonetheless is embedded within a reassuring sense of order and security; the narrative point of view that censures Faust’s misdeeds. The contradictions, repetitions, and superfluities of the earliest extant Faust version can be attributed not only to poor editing but also to attempts to expand the formula. The heavy moralizing in a version such as Widmann’s (Allen spells the name Widman) can be read in the light of an overemphasis on the ordering dimension of formulaic fiction.

Allen also attempts to demonstrate in the shift from the Calendar of Saints to the Faust story the passage from Catholic to Protestant world-views. Her thesis is best buttressed by two arguments. First, Luther criticizes the Calendar of Saints for the following reasons: the stories lack historical veracity; justification is based on God’s mercy not man’s stockpiling of merits; and the saints should not function as intermediaries between man and God. (The value of the hagiographies lies only in their demonstration of man’s frailty and potential weakness.) Second, Faust’s fear of hell and final remorse would be from a Catholic standpoint enough to save
Faust, whereas the Protestant position, which is also that of the text, demands an inner transformation through faith.

Allen opens her reading of *Doktor Faustus* by relating the novel's montage technique to the *Faustbuch*, a connection that does little to help us interpret the novel itself. Allen's inquiry, however, does implicitly suggest that the different uses of montage in the *Faustbuch*, in Goethe, Mann, and others would be a topic worthy of analysis.

Allen next considers the concept of narrative voice. In the *Faustbuch* the reader silently embraces Faust the heretic while the moralistic narrator explicitly condemns his deeds. The tension remains beneath the surface. In *Doktor Faustus* Serenus Zeitblom is the voice of moderation and restraint while at the same time Leverkühn's most ardent follower and devoted servant. Zeitblom embodies the contradictions, implicit in the *Faustbuch*, between official condemnation and latent acceptance of the hero, at times in Zeitblom's case explicit approval and implicit disapproval. Allen effectively shows that Zeitblom attempts to write a modern hagiography even as it becomes an antihagiography — the transformation stems in part from Adrian's identification with Faust, in part from the tension between Zeitblom's idolization of Leverkühn and the latter's destructive acts. The relatively simplistic formulaic fiction enters the complex world of the modern novel.

Allen also argues that Adrian's imitation of the *Faustbuch* stems from a kind of Nietzschean *resentment*. Adrian depreciates the ideal of spontaneous creation, represented in Beethoven, out of an unconscious sense of his own inadequacies. Because the naive ideal is unattainable, Adrian depreciates it — including all that it implies, for example, harmony, humanism, joy, and love. Leverkühn would surpass Beethoven by becoming his antithesis, a Faust figure. The problem I have with this reading is that it overlooks, first, Leverkühn's objective greatness (as a musical genius he differs from the weak heroes that populate so much of modern literature) and, second, the weaknesses of traditional humanism. In Allen's reading Leverkühn falsely negates the naive position. But Leverkühn scorns and relativizes this position not because he falsifies its ideality but because he sees through it. Leverkühn is intellectually more advanced, if nonetheless morally less admirable, than Zeitblom the humanist. Mann's novel rejects naive humanism precisely because it passes over into nihilism (this passage is represented, for example, in Zeitblom's identification with Leverkühn). The implications extend to seemingly minor events: Does Adrian destroy Rudi Schwerdtfeger because Adrian cannot love and because he resents Schwerdtfeger's ability to do so — as Allen argues (p. 124), or is it because Adrian eventually sees through Rudi and despises his superficiality? Does Adrian "envy" Schwerdtfeger's inability to understand Adrian (p. 139), or does he rather express disgust with Schwerdtfeger's intellectual inferiority (see chapter 41)?

Several other points in Allen's analysis of the novel invite counter positions: Zeitblom may mean to write "with political fervour against the Nazi regime" (p. 77) but he rarely succeeds; his rhetoric is often muffled by his own moderate acceptance of Nazi racial policies (chapter 1) and his occasional enthusiasm for the German war effort. His impotence vis-à-vis nationalist rhetoric is clear in his encounter with the Kridwiss circle (chapter 34). It is misleading to argue that Zeitblom's "'incompetence' as narrator" is "nowhere . . . greater" than in his version of the relationship between Rudi, Adrian, and Marie Godeau (p. 137). Zeitblom in fact sees what Allen does not, namely, that the triangle is set up not out of Adrian's
love for Rudi (p. 138) but out of his desire to destroy him (see chapter 42). Rudi by the way is not a “naively innocent” figure who rejects Adrian's advances (p. 138); on the contrary, the flirtatious Rudi courts Adrian (see chapter 38).

Allen's concise account of the important antihagiographical structure of the Faустbuch is enough to warrant placing it on a reserve list for any Faust seminar, graduate or undergraduate. Her account of hagiographical and antihagiographical elements in Doktor Faустus is certainly helpful for an understanding of Zeitblom's ambivalent attitude toward Leverkühn. Not all of Allen's scattered insights, however, will go uncontested. In addition, the book does not present a full-fledged reinterpretation of either the Faустbuch or the novel. Its interpretive claims remain rather modest.

The Faуст Legend is a photographic reproduction of neatly typed pages; its only flaws are the not infrequent erasure of individual letters or parts of letters, the occasional running together of distinct words, and a few ungrammatical constructions resulting from egregious typos, as for example on pp. 47, 97, 102, and 146. The book contains an index of names.

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Wellmer's lectures on Adorno as well as the one on "Art and Industrial Production" are interesting and productive. Their merit lies in their description of the fundamental aspects of Adorno's thinking as well as their willingness to engage in the difficult task of continuing a dialogue between modernity and postmodernity that has merely begun. With his contribution towards a dialectics of modernity and postmodernity, Wellmer, a representative of the so-called "Frankfurt School" and a disciple of Adorno, participates in a discourse that responds to postmodern concerns. Unlike Manfred Frank, however, who seeks to elaborate and discover hermeneutic presuppositions within poststructuralist thought, Wellmer undertakes a deconstructive reading of the main philosophical writings by Adorno, supposedly the most powerful thinker of Critical Theory. At least the equivocation of the preposition in the subtitle of Wellmer's book, Vernunftkritik nach Adorno ("A Critique of Reason after/according to Adorno"), allows us to make the assumption that this ambiguous rebellion of the son against the academic father-figure attempts to read Adorno with himself against himself.

However, aside from the fact that Wellmer does not explore this turn against the father of his own thought, the choice to unfold a dialectics of postmodernity within the limits of Adorno's writings can be justified on other grounds. This justification resides in the fact that Adorno's critique of reason—the logic of identity and conceptual definition, an integral subject and a semantic, i.e. representational notion of language—is articulated in an aesthetic realm: be it in reference to the modern work of art or be it as a philosophy which seeks to transform itself into an aesthetic product. The inseparability of aesthetic presentation (Darstellung) and the critique of a logic of representation as well as a logic of signification marks, as Wellmer points out, the moment where the modern and the postmodern discourse both