Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness by Robert B. Pippin
Review by: Mark W. Roche
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press on behalf of the German Studies Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1430188
Accessed: 10/07/2014 14:17

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Todorov, much discussed among academic critics over recent decades, as well as those often cited still earlier, such as Freud, Hegel, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Käte Hamburger, Gustav René Hocke, and Karl Kerényi. While it is useful to consider what relevance these thinkers may have for understanding Hoffmann and his “Sandmann,” Orlowsky’s discussion of them in relation to this text proves to be haphazard, capricious, and confusing — though not necessarily confused, because her choice of this manner of presentation is deliberate.

Some of Orlowsky’s information is indeed interesting and useful, for example that about Sandmann as a vocational term (157-58) and about the name Coppelius (160). The shifting perspectives and illogical development of the argument — if there actually is one — make it hard to recommend this study as more than a curiosity, however.

JAMES M. McGLATHERY, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign


Insisting on the untenability of Hegel’s systematic enterprise, Anglo-American Hegel criticism usually turns to a reduced but still useful Hegel: his doctrine of categories, his social and political thought, his discussion of art’s increasing self-reflexivity, etc. Pippin follows this direction but charts an original course by reading Hegel in the light of Kantian idealism, more specifically, Hegel’s appropriation and critique of Kant’s account of subjectivity in his transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding.

Pippin examines Kant’s deduction, which argues that experience depends on our use of categories, which are themselves anchored in the transcendental unity of apperception, the thinking self; Fichte’s appropriation of this discussion and unsuccessful attempt to resolve Kant’s aporias; as well as — and this constitutes the bulk of the work — Hegel’s Jena writings, the Phenomenology, and the Logic. The connecting link throughout is the idealist argument that “any subject must be able to make certain basic discriminations in any experience in order for there to be experience at all” (7-8).

Hegel continues the transcendental project of delineating the categories without which objects could not be conceived and, like Kant, Hegel develops the thesis of the self-conscious nature of judgment, Kant’s unity of apperception. But Hegel differs from Kant in abandoning reliance on intuition and replacing it with a self-determining conception of thought, developed — both internally and historically — as the concrete negation of alternatives.

This is a densely argued reconstruction of Hegel’s textual meanings in the light of the Kantian project. The book imaginatively relates diverse material
to one central, overarching thesis; its account of competing literature, for example, Henrich and Theunissen, is detailed and informative; and the individual analyses are full of Akribie and rich in prolepses. One high point among many is the discussion of the master/slave dialectic in the light of the idealist-epistemological concerns of the first three chapters of the Phenomenology rather than the ethical and social theory that follows.

Pippin’s critique culminates in an analysis of inadequacies in Hegel’s reflections on method at the end of his Logic, but recent criticism has shown that Hegel’s method is in fact shrewder than his reflections on method and can lead us to justify at least some of his more ambitious claims. Moreover, Pippin does not give enough attention to Hegel’s account of Kant’s inadequacies and thus the major moments that constitute a transition beyond subjective idealism: first, Kant’s unproven presuppositions, which lead Hegel, following Fichte, to the articulation of a first principle, developed via what we now call pragmatic contradictions, and second, the self-refuting concept of the thing-in-itself, which gives rise to Hegel’s complex reflections on the symmetry of logic and ontology and eventually to a Realphilosophie informed by logical structures. In contrast to Pippin’s minimalist view, I would argue that Hegel does return to the content of “precritical” metaphysics, but only by grounding this move in an extension of transcendental arguments. There is more to the Kant-Hegel nexus than Pippin’s account can deliver.

MARK W. ROCHE, Ohio State University


Im Buch die Bücher oder Der Held als Leser: der Titel von Ralph-Rainer Wuthenows bahnbrechender Studie von vor einem Jahrzehnt könnte auch zum Motto von Gail Harts lesenswerter Einführung in Readers and Their Fictions in the Novels and Novellas of Gottfried Keller dienen. Kellers Erzählwerke beschäftigen sich mehrheitlich in irgendeiner Form mit solchen lesenden Helden und mit der Frage nach Nutzen und Nachteil der Lektüre für das Leben.

Harts Endprodukt, eine Art Lesegeschichte über Geschichtenleser im Werk des Schweizers, hat mich streckenweit fasziniert. In allgemein sehr erhellenden und gelegentlich subtilen Einzelanalysen des proteischen Topos vom Einfluß der Literatur auf das Leben in der Literatur geht sie dem intimen und prekären, manchmal auch tragischen Dreiecksverhältnis von Kellers Literaturlesern zu ihren literarischen Vorbildern hier und zur (natürlich selbst