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Hölderlins Spinoza-Rezeption und ihre Bedeutung für die Konzeption des 'Hyperion' by
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makes the opposite error of giving the work too much weight in the life. In her chapter on Sophie Mereau, she blames Mereau's death (which was actually from complications following childbirth) on her failure as an artist: "Da ihr der Weg in die Kunst verstellt ist, bleibt ihr nur der in den Tbd" (51). The next chapter, "Johanna Schopenhauer oder die Entsagung," follows this pattern. Bürger argues: "Denn jetzt wird Entsagung zur Lebensform" (59). The fifth chapter presents Caroline Schlegel through her letters. Bürger stresses the importance of the small forms. Unfortunately, her depiction never reaches beyond the scope of the many short biographical sketches published. In overlooking Schlegel's letters from prison, Bürger misses an opportunity really to explore the connection between writing and life experience.

It is in the two chapters on the best-known writers, Rahel Varnhagen and Bettina von Arnim, that Bürger's inadequacies become most evident. Again, Bürger reads Rahel Varnhagen's life both in terms of the work and in terms of negative experiences: "Sie lebt nur als Schreibende, und das Geschriebene ist nicht 'Werk,' sondern ihr eigenes Leben als Form" (110). The chapter on Bettina von Arnim is most disconcerting and perplexing, because this essay is in no way comparable to Bürger's introduction to the Reclam anthology *Bettina von Arnim: Ein Lesebuch*, where she defines Arnim's life and work in terms of "Liebe." Here she contradicts not only her earlier piece but also almost all recent scholarship when she states: "Bettina von Arnims Wunschautobiographie ist nicht Deutung eines Lebensverlaufs von einem Endpunkt her und zu einem Ziel (der Bildung eines Individuums) hin . . ." (154). Her portrayal of Arnim, as of all the others, is based on a negative assessment of their lives. She speaks of "die Resignation, in der sie [Arnim] als unglückliches Bewußtsein gelebt hatte" (156).

The final chapter neither brings together the disparate individual chapters into a coherent whole, nor does it address theoretical issues alluded to earlier. Indeed, much of the material here appears to belong to the introduction or to be the leftovers from the chapters on individual writers. The supposed destructive opposition between art and life, never convincingly demonstrated as central to all the women discussed, preconditions the analysis of the lives and works of these important women writers. Bürger con-

demns their writings to an indeterminate "mittlere Sphäre" (109) between fiction and autobiography, rather than recognizing the aesthetic connections between diaries, letters, autobiographies, and epistolary and autobiographical fiction. Although she mentions the possibility of "eine andere Ästhetik" that would lead to "eine andere Subjektivität" (160), Bürger never travels this path. For this reason, her book does not contribute much to the ongoing reassessment of these writers and their lives.

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WEGENAST, MARGARETHE. *Hölderlins Spinoza-Rezeption und ihre Bedeutung für die Konzeption des 'Hyperion.'* Studien zur deutschen Literatur 112. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1990. viii + 277 pp. DM 82.

Several critics in recent years have stressed the importance of Spinoza for Hölderlin and for *Hyperion* in particular. Wegenast analyzes this relationship in detail, taking the reader from Hölderlin's earliest reflections to a lengthy discussion of *Hyperion* as a novel informed by Spinozistic categories.

Part A is an account of Hölderlin's earliest reception of Spinoza. Wegenast contextualizes, and thereby relativizes, Hölderlin's disapproval of Spinoza in the letter to his mother of February 1791. Hölderlin's early reflections on Spinoza and Jacobi are shown to be more original than had previously been believed.

Part B contrasts Hölderlin's and Schelling's views of Spinoza. The great contribution of Hölderlin to the history of German Idealism, which could be stated as recognition of the (transcendental) need for an absolute or an initial unity beyond the concepts of difference, individuality, and consciousness, is seen to have been developed in the context of Hölderlin's study of Spinoza.

Part C, by far the lengthiest section of the book, analyzes *Hyperion* in the light of Spinoza's influence. *Hyperion* posits ideals and totalities outside himself (in particular, objects or visions) even as he simultaneously identifies these ideals, in a mirroring way, with his own self. This external positing and its consistent deflating is

what is meant by Hyperion's "exzentrische Bahn." Only by overcoming this "all or nothing" dichotomy is Hyperion able to grasp the extent to which he participates in a universality that gives him identity and also allows him to endure pain and loss. Beyond the overarching thesis that the Hölderlinian celebration of *hen kai pan* can be traced to the influence of Spinoza, Wegenast also points to a number of discrete similarities and influences, primarily from Spinoza's *Ethics*, and she develops her thesis by analyzing the novel's characters in relation to one another and to (universal) nature.

Part D concludes the work with the thesis that *Hyperion* is a *Bildungsroman* in the historically determinate sense of a philosophical novel that seeks to provide an aesthetic solution to the metaphysical problem of grounding individuality. Moreover, *Hyperion* is a Spinozistic counter-model to the Leibnizian concept of *Bildung* we find in *Wilhelm Meister* and in most analyses of the genre. Following Spinoza's idea that the individual is a mode of the one absolute substance, Hölderlin sees selfhood as constituted by a universal framework that includes nature, history, and a community of subjects; according to Wegenast, Hölderlin's concept deals more successfully than the monadic model with suffering, death, despair, love, and nature.

There is no doubt of the importance of Wegenast's topic for students of German literature. The discussion of Hölderlin on Jacobi, along with the argument that Spinoza was central to the Hölderlin-Schelling relationship in 1795–96 is compelling; equally convincing is the argument that Hölderlin saw aesthetic intuition as the solution to the problem of how to grasp the absolute that is presupposed in any concept of individuality. The book contains previously overlooked aspects of Spinoza's influence on Hölderlin—for example, the Spinozistic language of "Eine Reflexion"—and several new insights into the novel, not least the comparison of Diotima's farewell letter and Hyperion's final vision of nature.

However, the book also has several shortcomings. First, the methodology is not rigorous. Wegenast views any concept of unity or unity in difference as Spinozistic. Thus, the Greek *hen kai pan* is not Heraclitean or Platonic but Spinozistic, although Spinoza himself never used the phrase. The question of Spinoza's influence is more complex than Wegenast assumes, especially when it comes to ideas that are shared by

a wide array of thinkers, many of whom Hölderlin knew. Related, Wegenast unconvincingly asserts that Spinoza is a thinker less of unity than of the unity of unity and difference. She herself seems more concerned with unity than the unity of unity and difference, for we get little sense of where Hölderlin deviates from Spinoza, and there are significant differences: in contrast to the wise man of Spinoza's *Ethics*, Hölderlin's Hyperion knows not only to overcome pain but also to affirm its constitutive character. In Spinoza's system, pain has no positive role; it is to be forgotten or eliminated. In *Hyperion*, pain is superseded only as it becomes an integral part of the character's development. A central difference also surfaces in the question whether the divine can suffer; for Spinoza, the answer is clearly no (*Ethics* V, prop. 17); for the mature Hyperion, the answer is yes: the gods do suffer (II: 106). Further, Spinoza cannot explain why, besides substance, there are also attributes or modes; in contrast, Hölderlin attempts to ground an answer to this question, which is central to the structure of *Hyperion*. Second, much of what Wegenast says in her reading of *Hyperion* has already been said by other critics and, in some cases, more thoroughly and with greater nuance, although these critics (who discuss or analyze, for example, such topics as the early "all or nothing" dialectic, the complexity of Hölderlin's selfhood, the eventual unity of unity and difference, the development of stillness and the affirmation of suffering, the significance of the *Scheltrede* as a narrative statement, the meaning of the text's two mottos, the novel's five concluding words, or even the influence of Spinoza) are not mentioned; no Germanist writing in English on *Hyperion* is acknowledged, whether one expects to see Corngold, Gaskill, Hamlin, Ogden, or this reviewer. Even some of the earlier German critics to discuss Spinoza are left unmentioned: e.g., Nickel, Mommsen, Bachmaier, and Prill. It is paradoxical at best that, in a work that defines individuality as participation in a whole, the author's contribution revolves around itself rather than other and earlier participants in the larger debate, from whom Wegenast might have learned something and, in other instances, known how to avoid repetition. Third, although Wegenast emphasizes aesthetic intuition as the solution to a major metaphysical quandary and analyzes one of the rhetorically most powerful texts in all of German literature, she makes the

text sound (only) like a philosophical work; the reader gets little sense of the beauty of Hölderlin's novel or of the ways in which its form determines its content. Finally, the book does not read well: its high number of participial nouns and abstractions are presented in an overwhelmingly hypotactic style; the thoughts are not clearly expressed, and some of the arguments are still vague.

Nonetheless, the book does have value for philosophers debating the German reception of Spinoza and the origins of German Idealism, for advanced students and scholars writing on *Hyperion*, and for students of the *Bildungsroman*. Insofar as Wegenast elevates, on behalf of Spinoza and Hölderlin, the concept of a universal and the importance of nature, the book takes on further relevance in an age that could be characterized by its solipsistic tendencies and its destruction of nature.

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Heinrich Heine: Ästhetisch-politische Profile.
Ed. Gerhard Höhn. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1991. 342 pp.

In the introduction to this anthology of essays, Gerhard Höhn expresses the hope that the volume will serve to propel the name Heinrich Heine into the mainstream of current critical debate on the aesthetics of modernism. This is a somewhat puzzling statement insofar as Heine's role as a precursor of modernism has been a topic of considerable scholarly attention since the mid-1950s, especially in the studies of Kurt Weinberg, Walter Höllerer, Franz Finke, and others. These seventeen contributions, all but two of which are new, are intended to form a basis for the reevaluation of Heine's significance—this despite the tacit acknowledgement that since the mid-1980s an epigonic phase of Heine research has been underway. "Heine . . . provoziert offensichtlich nicht mehr . . . dieser Vorläufer der Moderne wird heute als Klassiker gefeiert" (7). Höhn himself has contributed to this process of canonization by producing an extensive *Heine-Handbuch* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1987) which, useful as it is, serves to sum up and thus codify several decades of Heine

research.

Interestingly enough, almost exactly twenty-five years ago, Helmut Koopmann brought out in the series "Wege der Forschung" an anthology of previously published seminal studies on Heine (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft). That volume played a significant part in the resurgence of Heine scholarship in West Germany. In attempting to stimulate new thinking about Heine, Höhn certainly deserves plaudits. In this case, a host of established scholars is not simply anthologized, but rather given the opportunity in new essays, or "Profile," as they are called, to revisit old haunts and explore a few new ones. Thus Wolfgang Preisendanz elaborates on his earlier study of "Der Ironiker Heine"; Karlheinz Fingerhut offers a major contribution to the discussion of Heine as satirist; Fritz Mende returns to the question of Heine's political stance as a "Sohn der Revolution"; Bernd Kortländer again takes up the notion of Heine's early love poetry as "Poesie und Lüge"; Jost Hermand traces the erotic elements in the poetry, from *Buch der Lieder* to *Verschiedene*, as an expression of Heine's social protest; Michael Werner reexamines "Der Journalist Heine"; Robert C. Holub extends his study of Heine's reception of antiquity in "Heine als Mythologie." Three essays deal with aspects of Heine's Jewishness (Klaus Briegleb, Joseph A. Kruse, Manfred Windfuhr), two with Heine's intellectual and philosophical link to modernism (Höhn and Heinz Pepperle), one with his aesthetics (Rolf Hosfeld), one with the *Reisebilder* as a prototype of revolutionary literature (Peter Stein), and one with Heine's status as a historian (a second essay by Höhn). Two essays are reprints. Helmut Heißenbüttel's cogent refutation of Adorno's influential Heine critique, "Die Wunde Heine," was first given as a radio address; it is included here as a significant contribution to the modernism debate. The second reprint is Norbert Altenhofer's highly complex discussion of Heine's hermeneutics, "Chiffre, Hieroglyphe, Palimpsest," which has found its way into the volume presumably because there has been no significant follow-up to this 1979 essay.

The crucial question, of course, is how much truly new thinking has gone into these essays and how much is simply recapitulation or reformulation of previously stated views. Is the volume more capstone to a concluding era of frenzied Heine scholarship or cornerstone of a new