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ing. It does not use specific empirical concepts to define its objects, but must function in accordance with the general categorial framework of the understanding. Otherwise the products of the imagination would become nonsensical.

The wide gap that Krämling establishes between the theoretical object and the aesthetic object could be the result of the fact that his discussion of the Critique of Pure Reason was focused almost exclusively on ideas and ideals of reason. Kant himself admits that the ideal of the highest good in the Critique of Pure Reason has speculative implications only for the “intelligibele Welt. . . da die Sinnenwelt uns von der Natur der Dinge dergleichen systematische Einheit der Zwecke nicht verheimt” (KdrV, A814/B842). But this indicates a limit of the systematic pretensions of theoretical reason, not a limit of theoretical reason in the application of the categories of the understanding to experience. For the understanding there is an essential relation to particularity which is expressed in its determinant judgments about experience. The advance of reflective judgment for systematic questions is its capacity to apprehend the sensuous content of experience as possessing its own immanent form as distinct from form that is imposed from without in determinant judgments. But these two senses of form are not exclusive. Determinant judgments make it possible to understand external relations among objects. From the perspective of reflective judgment, each object is potentially a reflexively or internally related system, whether aesthetically or teleologically. Determinant and reflective judgments involve complementary approaches to reality, which should neither be isolated nor fused. Krämling’s claim that the distinction of these two modes of judgment is “lediglich eine methodische Abstraktion” (39) threatens to fuse them.

The overall contribution of the book is to confirm the relation between the aesthetic and the moral suggested by the idea of symbolism in the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment through a conception of culture as a teleological-practical mode of realizing the highest good in the human historical world. If the first Critique defined the realization of the highest good as a speculative hope, and the second Critique specified it as a transcendent duty, then the third can be said to transform it into an immanent challenge.

RUDOLF A. MAKKREEL

Emory University


This is a very important book. Hösle has undertaken the task of evaluating Hegel’s entire system, and he has done so with rigor, clarity, insight, and an eye to questions of relevance today. The critique functions in two ways: first, Hösle defends the basic Hegelian enterprise of finding a first principle and developing it logically even as he argues for major and minor revisions in Hegel's logical system; second, Hösle evaluates Hegel's Realphilosophie (the philosophy of nature and spirit) in relation to the Logic,
then from the standpoint of the revisions suggested in Hösle's critique of the Logic, and finally in relation to the discoveries of modern science.

Volume 1 opens with a historical account of the inner logic of transcendental idealism. Interesting is the focus on Fichte's programmatic Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre. What follows is a thorough and extensive analysis of Hegel's systematic enterprise, including a very helpful commentary on the relation of Realphilosophie to the individual sciences. Of particular significance in Hösle's analysis of the Logic are the reflections on forms of contradiction, including an invaluable contribution to our understanding of pragmatic contradictions, and a detailed reading of the concept of subjectivity in the Begriffslogik. Throughout his commentary Hösle pays special attention to those structures and arguments in the Logic that appear flawed, and he contrasts them with alternative positions in part from the earliest Hegelschüler. What is rejected as a result of Hösle's critique is not the idea of absolute idealism—that there is nonhypothetical a priori knowledge and that the laws of this knowledge are also the laws of reality—but Hegel's particular variant of it. A central thesis developed here, which is expanded in Volume 2, is that there is, however, no consistent correspondence between Hegel's Logic and his Realphilosophie. This originates in part from Hegel's elevation of reflexive subjectivity and of subject-object, instead of subject-subject, relations. For Hegel the highest activity of the spirit is knowledge of the world, not realization of the good.

Volume 2 employs the insights of Volume 1 in order to present a detailed commentary on the philosophies of nature and spirit. A major focus of this second volume is on the way a revision of Hegel's logic, in particular an extension of the logic to include the eminent structures of intersubjectivity—the dominant category of post-Hegelian philosophy—would lead to a better Realphilosophie (and indeed would alone lead to a justification of a correspondence between logic and Realphilosophie). Instead of commenting on every section of the philosophy of nature, Hösle focuses on those insights of Hegel that are still relevant today, the theory of space and time and what Hegel calls organic physics (the study of life from a combination of biochemical, system-theoretical, and environmental perspectives). A comprehensive discussion of the philosophy of spirit follows. Here, too, the focus is not just on Hegel but on the issues themselves insofar as Hegel helps us to deal with them. Thus, the question Hösle brings to the Philosophy of Right is not "Is it liberal or not?" but rather "Are the arguments against a liberal state valid or not?" The only work remotely like Hösle's in American Hegel scholarship is Alan White's Absolute Knowledge: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1983), though Hösle's work is more rigorous in its defense of first philosophy, more extensive in its application to practical problems, and more philosophical in its development of a critique of Hegel's weaknesses.

The book sparkles with both overarching and particular insights, and a short review can hardly do justice to its depth and breadth. Three passages, however, deserve to be highlighted: the discussion of the tetradic structure of Hegel's earliest system and its inherent superiority over the later triadic model (130–54); the entire discussion of objective spirit, for which the introduction of absolute intersubjectivity brings countless detailed insights (412–587); and the especially astute critique of He-
The first part of Young's work presents the Kantian legacy, the foundation for Schopenhauer's thought. This Kantian legacy is divided into three sections: (1) Schopenhauer's acceptance of transcendental idealism, (2) his acceptance of concept-empiricism, and (3) his rejection of transcendent metaphysics. Young's comments on this latter point are quite provocative. Schopenhauer accepts Kant's arguments against the possibility of there being a metaphysics that transcends all possible experience. But Young maintains Schopenhauer believed that there is an experientially grounded metaphysics, a naturalistic one. Young argues that Schopenhauer believed that between phenomena and noumenon there is a third world. Since this third world is not discernible by ordinary cognitive consciousness it may be considered as a metaphysical realm. However, this world is accessible by other states of consciousness such as the aesthetic, the moral, and the mystical.

The second part of Young's study bears the same title as Schopenhauer's second

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